The following article is unfinished, but I had to post it today because my local newspaper published an article about the supposed "ethics" of "excluding all meat except kangaroo [and camels]."
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GREEN MURDER: Eating Native Animals, Introduced Animals and Fishes
By Jeff Perz
INTRODUCTION
The title of this essay is intentionally provocative. It is hoped, however, that the arguments and conclusions that follow will prove to be conservative. There is a subset of environmental advocates who, recognising that animal agriculture contributes more to global warming than all of the world’s cars, planes and other transport combined[1], have stopped eating domesticated animals but continue to eat others. They claim:
Factory farms are an environmental disaster and involve extreme cruelty to animals. Hunting, killing and eating native animals, on the other hand, can be done humanely, need not involve cruelty and has little or no negative consequences for the environment. Indeed, when members of environmentally destructive introduced species are killed and eaten, this helps the environment. Also, Aboriginal / Indigenous / Native / First Nations peoples all over the world hunt, kill and eat native animals. Often, this is part of their spirituality and involves great respect for the animals who give their lives. To tell these people not to hunt would be racist and a form of advocating cultural genocide. Finally, eating fishes is morally acceptable because it need not be environmentally damaging and it is commonly understood that fishes do not feel pain. Therefore, people of every culture can eat native animals, introduced animals and fishes, and this is ethical, environmentally friendly and can even be spiritual.
I will argue that the above view is false in two parts. First, I will draw a human analogy. In other words, I will make the same claims made above, except I will replace the non-human animals in the examples with humans. This exercise will illustrate the speciesist double-standard that most of us have; we find actions directed at non-human animals to be morally acceptable that we would never accept if directed at humans. The response to this realisation is often that the double-standard is morally justified because “they are just animals.” In other words, it is claimed that the moral status of non-human animals is lesser than that of humans.
The second part of my response will refute the view that non-human animals have lesser moral status and argue that they are moral persons, and ought to be legal persons; that is, beings who have full moral standing. As Gary L. Francione has argued, recognising the personhood of non-human animals does not mean that they would have the “same” non-basic rights as most humans. For example, neither severely mentally challenged humans nor typical adult macaque monkeys have the non-basic right to a university education, because neither would benefit from this right; they do not have an interest in a university education. All human and non-human animals, however, share the same basic interests in life, freedom and bodily integrity – and these ought to be protected equally with basic rights. As Francione notes, the most basic of all rights is the right not to be property, a “thing,” or treated as a resource.
Finally, I will conclude that, if environmentalists are to avoid self-contradictory assumptions, we must embrace veganism as a diet, lifestyle and political stance. Vegans eat a diet free of honey, meat, dairy, eggs and other animal products. Vegans do not wear silk, wool, leather and other animal products – and instead wear natural fibres such as hemp, cotton, linen, bamboo/banana silk, or synthetic fibres—whether second hand or new. Vegans do not consume products that are tested on animals, attend animal circuses or engage in other activities that exploit non-human animals.
HUMAN ALALOGY
Consider the following arguments, which I reject:
The war in Iraq involves the murder of civilians, extreme cruelty and has been an environmental disaster. Conversely, it has been claimed that some Indigenous people in Papua New Guinea practiced or continue to practice cannibalism. If this is true, assume that their victims are innocent, healthy and do not consent to being killed. Sacred cultural rituals accompany the non-consensual killings; a song, dance, prayer and giving thanks ceremony. From this, it is concluded that when Indigenous Papua New Guineans sustainably kill and eat other humans, this can be done humanely, need not involve cruelty and has little or no negative consequences for the environment. This is part of their spirituality and involves great respect for the humans who give their lives. To tell these people not to practice cannibalism would be racist and a form of advocating cultural genocide.
Similarly, for various reasons, refugee crises sometimes happen where tens of thousands of people cross boarders and the available aid in the refuge country is insufficient. Because of this, the masses of refugees cause great environmental devastation and disrupt the economy. Due to their circumstances, health and sanitation conditions amongst the refugees are very poor, and they spread disease to the larger population of the refuge country. Sometimes, it is certain that sufficient aid will never become available in time to prevent the significant damage caused by the refugees. So, it is concluded, members of environmentally destructive introduced humans should be killed and buried, as this would help the environment.
Therefore, people of every culture can kill native humans and introduced humans, and this is ethical, environmentally friendly and can even be spiritual.
Imagine you met someone who solemnly expressed the above views in all seriousness and sincerity. Most people would react with shock, disgust and moral outrage. Now, I ask you to re-read the above original passage in the Introduction to this essay, which advocates the killing of native and introduced non-human animals.
In the case of human animals, the environment, culture and spirituality are not used as excuses for killing and other forms of exploitation. Some of us may adhere to cultural and ethical relativism, but even relativism has its limits. For example, even though female genital mutilation has been a very long-standing cultural tradition in various African cultures, the deaths and acute and chronic pain and suffering associated with female genital mutilation are sufficient to condemn it with a cross-cultural objective standard of morality.
In the examples above, when human animals are killed and exploited we react with shock, disgust and moral outrage. When non-human animals are killed and exploited, our reactions range from bland acceptance to enthusiastic approval. When the example involves human refugees, we automatically think that their circumstance is not their fault; it is the fault of some oppressive military regime, or a natural disaster. When the example involves introduced non-human animals, we fail to realise that it is not their fault – that it was we humans who forcefully and wrongfully introduced them to a foreign environment in the first place, and that their plight is therefore our responsibility. Alternatively, if we do recognise that introduced non-human animals are blameless for their circumstance, we do not regard this fact as morally significant.
In the case of human refugees, we are motivated to find effective and non-violent solutions to the problem. In the case of introduced non-human animals, we reach for a rifle, canister of poison or dinner fork. Similarly, cultural, spiritual and environmentally-friendly sustainable cannibalism is rejected whereas the killing and exploitation of non-human animals is broadly accepted.
The reason for this gross disparity of beliefs and actions is simple; speciesism. Speciesism is a failure to treat the similar interests of individuals similarly, on the basis of their species. Speciesism shares the same logic of oppression that classism, racism, sexism and heterosexism contain; they all disregard or harm the interests of individuals because those individuals possess a morally irrelevant characteristic. Environmental and social justice advocates recognise that different forms of oppression are interconnected; for example, classism is the cause of much institutional racism, sexism, war and environmental destruction. Sexism and racism can combine beyond the sum of their parts. Similarly, speciesism and sexism[2], speciesism and racism[3] and speciesism and classism[4] are intimately intertwined and build upon one another. As environmental advocates, we can recognise and reject speciesism. We can go vegan for both our environment and for all of the sentient beings who share this environment with us.
ARGUMENT AGAINST SPECIESISM AND FOR VEGANISM
The Precautionary Principle, long advocated by environmental advocates, states that if an action might cause harm, the onus is on the person who wishes to carry out the action to provide justification for why the action is not harmful. When non-human animals are hunted, shot, forcefully confined, slaughtered and otherwise exploited, they are harmed. When we consume animal products, we cause this harm. So, if we choose to consume animal products, the onus is on us to provide a justification for this harm, or a justification for the view that little or no harm is, in fact, taking place. If no valid justification can be found, then the Precautionary Principle requires us to refrain from the harmful practice and return to the default position of veganism.
Although the onus of justification does not fall on vegan advocates, I will nevertheless present the following simple and classic argument for the equal basic rights of human and non-human animals—which entails veganism.
Imagine that highly intelligent and extremely pacifist space aliens come to Earth and introduce themselves. Would it be ethical to kill them, eat them or use them in painful and lethal medical experiments? Most of us would answer “no” to this question. Do these aliens have full moral standing, equal to the moral standing that humans have? Most of us would answer “yes.” If the same two questions were asked about severely mentally challenged humans, then most of us would agree that it is wrong to kill or otherwise exploit them, and that they are moral and legal persons with full moral standing.
The answers to the above questions illustrate that we believe that (a) being genetically human and (b) having symbolic language or the capacity for highly abstract reasoning are not required to be a person—who, in contrast to a thing, must not be forcefully confined, hunted, subjected to pain and suffering, killed or otherwise used as a resource. The logical conclusion of our answers to the above questions is this: The only thing that is necessary for personhood, or full moral standing, is having interests.
It is patently clear that severely mentally challenged humans have interests. They have an interest in continued life; that is, continuing to have subjective consciousness, experiences and perceptions. They have an interest in not being subjected to pain and suffering. They have an interest in their own well-being, in addition to many other interests.
Similarly, it is patently clear that non-human animals, at the very least, have the same basic interests in life, freedom, bodily integrity, well-being and not being used as a resource that all humans have. Anyone who has lived with a dog knows this. Anyone who has witnessed a kangaroo or a deer attempt to evade a hunter’s bullet knows this. In addition, it has been scientifically proven beyond any reasonable doubt that all non-human animals – including fishes[5], insects[6] and other invertebrates[7] – have the capacity for self-awareness and the perception of pleasure and pain.[8] Having these capacities entails that they have the abovementioned interests, as argued above.
Finally, it is patently clear that plants do not have any interests whatsoever. As Francione has remarked, “if I ate your tomato and your dog, you would not regard those as similar acts.”[9] In addition, it has been proven beyond any scientific doubt that plants, lacking central nervous systems, do not have the capacity for sentience or self-awareness.[10] The claims to the contrary found in new age magazines have been disproved and exposed as fraud.[11]
As the above questions and answers illustrate, we recognise that being genetically human or having sophisticated mental abilities is not necessary for a being to have personhood. Having interests, on the other hand, is necessary and sufficient for being a person. Since non-human animals have interests, they are persons, or beings with full moral standing. Having this standing means that, whether they are human or non-human animals, we must not exploit them as resources, bring them into existence (breed) them for our purposes, kill them, confine them nor subject them to pain and suffering. In short, we must embrace a vegan lifestyle. Otherwise, we contradict ourselves when we claim that it would be immoral to use an intelligent alien or severely mentally challenged human as a resource.
If the above argument that non-human animals have full moral standing is valid, then the above analogies regarding sustainably hunting non-human versus human animals are also valid. In other words, unless some sort of flaw in the logic of the above argument can be clearly demonstrated, the conclusion that inescapably follows is that we – individually should go vegan.
A separate and different question is this: should humans of European ancestry spend their time persuading Aboriginal peoples to go vegan? Since I come from a culture that has factory farms and industrial slaughterhouses, it would be hypocritical of me to go out of my way to voice objection to the practices of another culture that I find equally immoral to the practices of my own culture. In other words, both (a) killing a free-living non-human animal (supposedly “painlessly”) in a subsistence hunt and (b) killing a domesticated non-human animal in a horrendously painful way in a slaughterhouse both involve treating the other as an object. Both practices should be abolished. To avoid engaging in cultural imperialism, I spend my activist time doing vegan education directed towards the general public—which, of course, includes both non-Aboriginals and Aboriginals alike. Aboriginal vegans exist. As more activists do vegan education, and more of the public goes vegan, there will be more Aboriginal vegans. Aboriginal vegans can do vegan education and introduce creative and culturally appropriate methods to their cultures. The vast majority of Aboriginal cultures have rich traditions of vegan cuisine. Again, I direct my vegan education towards the general public and do not focus on a particular culture.
Regardless of the form of one’s advocacy, it is clear that the above argument for non-human animal personhood requires us as individuals to go vegan. As environmental advocates, let us recognise the links between environmental destruction, the various forms of human oppression and the oppression of non-human animals. Let us embrace veganism.
CONCLUSION
After reading this essay, two things are likely. First, perhaps you agree with the logic and conclusion of the above moral argument, and see that the human analogies and call for veganism follow from this.
Second, it may be that you feel resistance to the idea of going vegan. We do not like to be told what to do, we enjoy the taste of animal products, we have health concerns about a vegan diet and it can be difficult to change. In other words, when we think of going vegan, we may feel resistant because we rightly place high value on personal choice, taste enjoyment, our own health and ease or convenience.
Going vegan is easy. The other concerns mentioned above have answers. All we need is information and to give this issue the serious attention that it merits. As environmental and human rights advocates, we claim to be deeply concerned with the principles of non-violence, justice and respect. I ask you to research veganism and animal rights further, and come to your own informed decision. An excellent place to start is Gary L. Francione’s books, such as Animals as Persons. Alternatively, Francione has developed excellent text-focused video/slideshow presentations, available at:
http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/video/
For the sake of our fellow sentient beings with whom we share our environment, think critically about veganism and find out more.
NOTES
[1] United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organisation, Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options (Rome: FAO Publishing Management Service, 2006), pp. xxi, 112; ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/A0701E/A0701E00.pdf; Christopher Matthews, “Livestock a major threat to environment.” FAONewsroom, 29 November 2006; http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/200 ... index.html.
[2] Carol J. Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory, 10th Anniversary ed. (New York: Continuum Publishing Corporation, 2000); Carol J. Adams and Josephine Donovan, eds., Animals & Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations (Duke University Press, 1995); Carol J. Adams, The Pornography of Meat (New York: Continuum Publishing Corporation, 2003).
[3] Marjorie Spiegel, The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery (New York: Mirror Books, 1996); Charles Patterson, Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and The Holocaust (New York: Lantern Books, 2002).
[4] Bob Torres, Making A Killing: The Political Economy of Animal Rights (Oakland: AK Press, 2007).
[5] Lynne U. Sneddon, “The Evidence for Pain in Fish: The Use of Morphine as an Analgesic,” Applied Animal Behavior Science 83, No 2. 2003, pp. 153-162; Lynne U. Sneddon, Victoria A. Braithwaite, and Michael J. Gentle, “Do Fishes Have Nociceptors? Evidence for the Evolution of Vertebrate Sensory System,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B 270, No. 1520. 2003, pp. 1115-1122; Steve C. Kestin, Pain and Stress in Fish (Horsham, England: Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 1994), p. 27.
[6] C.H. Eisemann et al., “Do Insects Feel Pain?—A Biological View,” Experientia (now Cellular and Molecular Life Sciences) 40. 1984, pp. 164-167; V.B. Wigglesworth, “Do Insects Feel Pain?” Antenna 4. 1980, pp. 8-9.
[7] Laura M. Harrison et al., “The Opiate System in Invertebrates,” Peptides 15, No 7. 1994, pp. 1309-1329; Graziano Fiorito, “Is There ‘Pain’ in Invertebrates?” Behavioural Processes 12. 1986, pp. 282-288.
[8] The U.S. Health Service states, “Unless the contrary is established, investigators should consider that procedures that cause pain or distress in human beings may cause pain or distress in other animals.” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, “Public Health Service Policy and Government Principles Regarding the Care and Use of Animals,” in Institute of Laboratory Animal Resources, Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996), p. 117; The U.S. National Research Council stated that animals used in experiments “will be subjected to conditions that cause them pain and distress.” Committee on Pain and Distress in Laboratory Animals, Institute of Laboratory Animal Resources, Commission on Life Sciences, National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation of Pain and Distress in Laboratory Animals (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992), p. ix; Donald. R. Griffin, Animal Minds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 248-249.
[9] Gary L. Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), p. 180.
[10] “Plants do not have central nervous systems, endorphins, receptors or any of the other indicia of sentience.” Ibid.
[11] Regarding Cleve Backster’s connecting plants to polygraph machines, and the invalidity of his conclusions, see: A.W. Galston and C. L. Slayman, “The Not-So-Secret Life of Plants,” American Scientist 67. 1979, pp. 337-344; K.A. Horowitz, D.C. Lewis and E. L. Gasteiger, “Plant Primary Perception,” Science 189. 1975, pp. 478-480; J.M. Kmetz, “A Study of Primary Perception in Plants and Animal Life,” Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research 71, No. 2. 1977, pp. 157-170; John M. Kmetz, “Plant Perception,” The Skeptical Inquirer. Spring/Summer 1978, pp. 57-61; http://skepdic.com/plants.html;
Regarding the supposed “screaming” that sensitive equipment has detected when plants are damaged, this is caused by movement of gasses. The cut releases the pressure allowing gases inside the plant to move towards the cut, making a noise as they do so. See: Dan Charles, “‘Stressed’ Plants ‘Cry’ for Help,” New Scientist. 8 March, 1997.
You are in the vanguard of this effort! 
(I mean endnote [10] not [9].)
